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O
ne day after the abrupt resignation of Japanese prime minister Shinzo Abe,
Burgess Professor of Political Science Gerald Curtis spoke before an audience of
about 170 at the School of International and Public Affairs on September 13,
2007. The speech, titled “Abe’s Gone . . . Is the LDP Next?” focused on Abe’s one-year tenure
as prime minister and the reasons for his fall from power, the July election defeat of the
Liberal Democratic Party, and future prospects for Japanese politics, the economy, and 
foreign relations.
Although Abe started out with high approval ratings and made positive initial overtures to
neighbors such as China, he soon fell out of favor with the Japanese public after a series of 
public gaffes by his cabinet, poor crisis management of a situation involving 50 million lost 
pension records, and vaguely stated policy goals such as constitutional revision and making
Japan a “beautiful country.” He seemed out of touch with a constituency concerned about its
own economic well-being, especially in rural areas that felt left behind by reforms instituted by
his popular predecessor, Junichiro Koizumi.
Professor Curtis reviewed the reasons behind the LDP’s crushing defeat in the July Upper
House Diet elections. The public’s three “nos” were a no to Abe’s priorities, favoring vague 
ideological issues over economic issues, which were a greater concern to the voting public; 
a no to Abe’s crisis management, evidenced especially in his response to the pension scandal;
and a no to economic reforms that neglected the rural farm areas. 
The next prime minister, Yasuo Fukuda of the LDP, faces an uphill battle on several key
fronts. A resurgent Democratic Party of Japan led by Ichiro Ozawa threatens the LDP’s 
traditional power base in the hinterlands and will most likely scuttle attempts to renew 
antiterror legislation in the Diet, which allows the Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force to
refuel foreign naval vessels in the Indian Ocean. But Fukuda brings a sense of balance, stability,
and experience to the office of the prime minister, which is exactly what the public is looking for
after the five and a half years of Koizumi’s charismatic leadership and the disastrous one-year
tenure of Mr. Abe.
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this week, Gerry said that he did
not think he would last until the
new year, but I suspect you were 
as surprised as the rest of us that
yesterday, Prime Minister Abe
abruptly resigned his position.
However, Japan’s political
story is about a lot more than Abe.
It is about the Liberal Democratic
Party, the Democratic Party of
Japan, the Komeito, other parties,
and all the major political players. 
Until yesterday, the title of
Gerry’s lecture was “Can Abe
Survive . . . Can the LDP Survive
Abe?” Now the title is “Abe’s Gone 
. . . Is the LDP Next?” Both are 
very straightforward statements. 
Gerry, thank you very much.
GERALD CURTIS
Burgess Professor of Political
Science, Columbia University
Thank you, Hugh, thank you toeverybody for coming, and
thank you to Prime Minister Abe 
for providing material for what
should be an interesting speech.
Whether it turns out to be interest-
ing or not is for all of you to judge.
The evens of the last few days have
left the Japanese dumbfounded.
Just three days ago, Abe gave his
policy address to the Diet. The next
day, an hour before he was to be
interrogated by the leaders of the
opposition parties, he threw in the
towel, announcing his resignation.
He had been in office almost
exactly one year.
It has been a very important
month and a half in Japanese poli-
tics starting on July 29, when the
Upper House election was held and
the Liberal Democratic Party suf-
fered a huge defeat. For the first
time ever, a party other than the
LDP is now the largest party in one
of the two houses of the Japanese
Diet. Virtually no legislation that
the Democratic Party of Japan
opposes will now pass the Diet.
The Constitution provides that a
bill defeated in the Upper House
becomes law if passed by a two-
thirds majority in the Lower House,
but procedurally and in terms of
timing, this is very difficult to do.
The next salient event was the
fact that Abe did not resign on the
night that the results came out. He
said he intended to stay in office.
This surprised nearly everyone else
in the LDP, but nobody wanted to
push him out because they could
not agree on whom to put in his
place. In retrospect, Abe must
regret that decision. If he had
taken responsibility for the party’s
defeat and resigned gracefully and
immediately, he might have been
able to come back to a leadership
role sometime in the future, espe-
cially considering that he is still 
in his early fifties. It is extremely
difficult to imagine that he has any
political future now.
A couple of weeks after the
election, he reshuffled his cabinet
to reflect more experience. The
new chief cabinet secretary was
Kaoru Yosano, Taro Aso was the
secretary general, Masahiko
Komura the defense minister, and
Nobutaka Machimura the foreign
minister. 
It seemed to many that Abe
had bought himself some time.
Even those who believed that his
days were numbered thought he
probably would last until the end of
the year. It became painfully clear,
however, that he did not have a
strategy to rebound from the elec-
tion defeat. He was unprepared 
for the office of prime minister and
could not survive. I think most
observers assumed that the LDP
would not go to a general election
with Abe at its helm, but, as I said,
the suddenness of his resignation
caught everyone by surprise.
Before we examine the events
of the past week and speculate
about the future, we should review
the July election results, how it was
that Mr. Abe became prime minister,
and the deeper structural issues
that lie behind the current situation. 
So let me say a word first about
the election. As we know, the LDP
lost very badly. The reasons are
what I call the public’s three “nos.” 
“No” number 1 is a no to Abe’s
priorities. Abe’s priorities were 
constitutional revision, overcoming
the postwar system, in other
words, getting rid of many of the
reforms that were instituted 60
years ago by the American occupa-
tion authorities, and creating a
so-called “beautiful country.” 
The problem is that these priorities
have little to do with the real 
concerns of the Japanese people.
Those concerns are whether
the pension system is sustainable,
whether the universal healthcare
insurance system remains viable,
whether public school education
can be improved, and the like. We
used to think of the compulsory
education system in Japan as
among the best in the world, but
there has been a sharp deteriora-
tion since the 1990s. Now many
middle class Japanese are sending
their children to private schools,
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One of my honors and pleasures at
Columbia is to introduce speakers
on special occasions like this.
Today our speaker is Gerald Curtis,
Burgess Professor of Political
Science. In my unbiased opinion, 
he is the most knowledgeable 
specialist on Japanese politics in
the United States and probably
anywhere in the world. 
He knows the major politicians,
the players in all the major parties,
and even some that are not so
major over the years. He is now
back at Columbia University this
fall after having spent the spring
semester and summer in Tokyo,
which has been his style for the
last few years, and I suppose will
be for the next few as well.
I assume that you all know who
Gerry Curtis is, and if you do not,
you can refer to his biography. I will
not say anything more to introduce
him. I think it is more important that
we give him the chance to speak.
I will note, though, that a year
ago, actually on September 26, 
he spoke at a similar occasion here
and expressed his concern about
the new prime minister, Shinzo
Abe. He even wondered if Abe
would last a year. I know that early
just as we see in New York City. In
the past, only the very wealthy did this.
Abe had almost nothing con-
crete to propose about economic
and social issues. For him, the 
primary issue was revision of the
Japanese Constitution, which was
written during the U.S. occupation.
Many Japanese now are not
opposed to constitutional revision,
but for the great majority this is a
practical issue, not an ideological
one. In other words, if there is
something that Japan needs to do
that it cannot do because of the
way a particular constitutional 
provision is written, such as Article
Nine, the no war clause, then there
is broad support for amending it.
But for Abe, constitutional revision
was an ideological issue. He never
specified what he wanted to change.
He basically wanted to accomplish
what was set out in the LDP’s 
first platform in 1955—to throw
out the constitution written by
Americans, and to discard a lot of
other American-inspired reforms 
as well. On this, the public was 
not with him. 
Abe’s conviction has its roots
in the experience of his grandfather,
Nobusuke Kishi, prime minister of
Japan from 1957 to 1960. One of
his key foreign policy initiatives
was the reworking of the security
relationship with the United States. 
Abe spoke to the Japanese
people in generalities. He wanted
to make revision of the Constitution
the key issue in the Upper House
election. But such a focus did not
make much sense to the Japanese
public. 
Another example of his ten-
dency to speak in generalities was
his focus on making Japan a “beau-
tiful country.” What he meant by
this remained a mystery to the end.
The Japanese public wanted him to
focus on important economic
issues, and on dealing quickly and
thoroughly with the disappearance
of 50 million pension records. This
pension scandal turned into Abe’s
“Hurricane Katrina.”
Fifty million lost accounts were
the result of 30 years of careless
behavior by the Social Insurance
Agency and the consequences of 
a system in which, until recently,
every time someone changed a 
job he got a new pension account
number. The scandal itself was not
directly Abe’s responsibility, any-
more than the devastation to 
New Orleans caused by Hurricane
Katrina was the fault of President
Bush. But the American people
were deeply critical of the way
President Bush responded to that
crisis, and in a similar manner, the
Japanese public lost confidence in
Prime Minister Abe because of the
lack of leadership he showed in
dealing with the pension crisis. 
The second “no” was to Abe’s
management skill, or lack thereof.
He could not convince the people
that he could handle the pension
issue. He also did not appear in
control of his own cabinet and 
vacillated when cabinet ministers
got caught up in scandals or com-
mitted verbal gaffes. During his
administration, Health Minister
Hakuo Yanagisawa called women
“baby making machines,” Defense
Minister Fumio Kyuma, who is
elected from Nagasaki, made
remarks appearing to accept the
atomic bombing of Japan in 1945
as unavoidable, and Agriculture
Minister Toshikatsu Matsuoka 
committed suicide while facing
scrutiny over political funding. 
The Japanese public said no to
Abe’s lack of crisis management
skills. If Junichiro Koizumi had still
been in office, his response to the
pension scandal would have been
far swifter and more vocal. He
would have banged on the table,
criticized everyone for letting this
happen, and his approval ratings
would have gone up.
The third “no” was a no to the
LDP’s failure to respond to the
needs of people in the provinces
who were not benefiting from 
economic reform. It was not neces-
sarily a no to economic reform, but
it was a strong protest against the
idea that economic reform should
leave some sectors of society behind
in order to grow the economy over-
all. This factor is very important in
terms of the structural change
going on in Japan and the opportu-
nity it presents for the DPJ.
In the Upper House election
system, each prefecture gets one
to four seats, depending on the
size of its population. There are 
29 prefectures that elect only one
member each to the Upper House
because they are sparsely populated.
In contrast, Tokyo, for example
elects four representatives. 
The elections are held in three-
year cycles for six-year terms.
Those running in this electoral
cycle replace people who were
elected six years ago, when there
were 27 such single-member pre-
fectures. The LDP won 25 seats
and other parties won two. This
time, six years later, the LDP won
six seats out of 29. The opposition,
mostly the DPJ, won 23. In other
words, the LDP lost this election 
in the areas where it traditionally
has been strongest, that is, in rural
and semiurban Japan. So now 
the politics of the countryside 
has become a major problem and
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There is absolutely no doubt 
in my mind that Yasuo Fukuda will
become president of the LDP on
September 23 and prime minister.
He will have to spread the benefits
of reforms without reversing them.
It can be said that Abe’s biggest
failure was his inability to buy time
for the economic reform process 
to spread its benefits beyond the
major cities. Prime Minister Fukuda
will have to convince people in the
provinces that the LDP feels their
pain but not embrace policies that
put the reform process into reverse
gear or exacerbate the government’s
fiscal deficit.
Politicians have to try to make
people feel optimistic about the
future and convince them that
whatever problems they are suffer-
ing now will be resolved. But that is
not the mood in Japan today, and
the result is the three “nos” that 
led to the LDP’s defeat in the July
elections. 
But there was not a “yes” in 
this election. The election result
was not a “yes” to the DPJ but a no-
confidence vote in Prime Minister
Abe and a criticism of the LDP. I do
not think you can read this election
result as an endorsement of the
idea that the DPJ should come to
power. The challenge for the DPJ 
is to figure out how to leverage its
victory to get people to think that it
would be better at governing than
the LDP. That obviously is what it
needs to do to win a majority in the
next Lower House election. It is not
there yet.
My original speech was titled
“Can Abe Survive? Can the LDP
Survive Abe?” The first question
has been answered. No, he did not
survive. Will the LDP survive? It is
far too soon to make a prediction
about the outcome of the next
Lower House election, but it is far
from certain that the DPJ will win.
If I were forced to place my bet, 
I would wager that the LDP will
probably emerge victorious, though
with a bare majority instead of the
two thirds majority it currently
enjoys. 
So there is an unhappy elec-
torate, not knowing really what
would be best, but not liking the
performance of the LDP. And it is
the electorate outside the metro-
politan areas that is unhappiest.
This is why the LDP was defeated
in areas such as Kyushu, Shikoku,
and Hokkaido.
As I mentioned before, if Abe
had quit the evening the election
results were announced, he might
have had a political future. He could
have come back in a few years. Or,
if he had said he was submitting his
resignation and let the LDP decide
his fate, there is a good chance it
would have asked him to stay on
because it wasn’t ready for a fight
over this succession.
But by refusing to step down,
he faced widespread criticism, and
by reshuffling his cabinet to bring
in well known LDP leaders, he sud-
denly looked like a figurehead with
the government being run by his
new ministers, particularly by the
chief cabinet secretary, Yosano,
and the LDP secretary general, Aso. 
For example, three agriculture
ministers were forced out of office
under Abe. One of them committed
suicide. The last one, Takehiko
Endo, did not last a week, but it 
was Yosano and Aso who fired him,
and then they told Abe about it. 
It can be said that Abe became
a hostage in the prime minister’s
office while everybody else was
running the government, and he
became psychologically unhinged.
There are many rumors about why
he quit; one magazine mentioned
financial and personal scandals. I
have no idea whether there is any
truth to these rumors, and I tend to
doubt it, but the main point is that
Abe quit because he was no longer
physically or psychologically able
to carry out his responsibilities as
prime minister. 
In light of these recent events,
one must ask how Abe became
prime minister in the first place. 
In postwar Japan, the tradition has
been for the prime minister to have
had extensive experience in the
government and the party before
rising to the topmost position. But
before he became prime minister,
the only cabinet post that Abe had
held had been as chief cabinet 
secretary under Junichiro Koizumi
for a relatively short period of time.
He was only elected to the Diet
four times. 
It is clear Abe was not prepared
for the position of prime minister.
Why did he get it? There are two
reasons. One is that Koizumi identi-
fied him as his favored candidate.
Koizumi did not want anybody his
age or older to be prime minister.
He believes that there has to be a
generational change in Japanese
politics. I am not sure he had a lot
of confidence in Abe’s abilities, 
but he concluded that Abe was the
best option among the available
candidates. 
Koizumi does not have a deep
sense of loyalty to the LDP, it seems
to me. He wants to see Japan
change, and if the LDP fails, then
having the DPJ come to office
might not be such a bad thing.
When he said that he would
destroy the LDP if that is what it
took to change Japan, he meant it.
In 2005, he recruited candidates
The election result 
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to run against every LDP Lower
House member who voted against
his postal privatization bill. He can
be considered a wild card in
Japanese politics. 
He has refused to run for prime
minister again, however, in spite of
pleas from the “Koizumi children”
he backed in the Diet election after
he dissolved the Lower House in
2005. He may run again for a Diet
seat in the next election, but that
will probably be his last campaign. 
Aside from Koizumi’s support,
the single-member district system
and what can be termed “dynastic
succession” contributed to Abe’s
rise. Nearly any prime minister that
comes to mind is the descendant of
a Diet member—Abe, Aso, Koizumi,
Fukuda, etc. This tradition is cer-
tainly not alien to the United States,
but in Japan, unlike any other
democracy, it is of overwhelming
importance. 
Japan used to have what was
called chusenkyokuseido, or a 
middle-sized district system in
which several LDP people ran from
the same district. If a politician
died in office, his son would run for
the LDP and would usually get
elected the first time in a sympathy
vote. If he did not have political
skill, however, he would lose after
one or two elections. 
So when you had dynastic 
succession under the middle-sized
election system, these politicians
had to demonstrate their skill as
politicians. They had to relate to
the voters. They had to know how
to raise money. They had to know
how to get people to come out and
support them in their district. If
they were weak, some faction in
the LDP would run a new candidate
in the district to challenge him.
There was a healthy tension in the
system because of intraparty com-
petition. The problem now is that
the heirs to their fathers’ Diet seats
have no competition in the LDP
because there is only one candi-
date per party. Eventually, if the
DPJ becomes stronger and runs
credible candidates in all the dis-
tricts, the situation will change. But
for now there are many districts
where heirs to LDP held seats face
no significant competition. 
The single-member district
system is pulling out the roots of
Japanese grassroots democracy. It
is a very bad system for Japan and
is a major reason why good leaders
are not emerging. But the chances
of electoral system reform are nil. 
Abe won because the single-
member district system has turned
elections into a popularity contest
between party leaders. In the past,
the party leader mattered on the
margin, but what decided elections
were individual candidates with a
good machine and an attractive
personality interacting with their
voters. You might have a change of
power under this new system if the
DPJ comes in, but the result will be
a lot of inexperienced people trying
to run a complex government. 
But now, what the parties look
for is who is going to be most popular.
This was another legacy of Koizumi
and his charisma. Abe, with his 
distinguished political lineage,
seemed appealing, based upon this
standard. Not only was his grand-
father a prime minister, but his
father was also foreign minister
under Yasuhiro Nakasone. 
So now, we are at the next
stage, which is the choice of a 
successor. Public opinion polls
show that more than 70 percent 
of Japanese viewed his resignation
as musekinin, or irresponsible. The
perception is that Abe resigned
abruptly without consideration of
the consequences for Japan, and
the LDP has to change this.
So the decision was made 
yesterday to hold an open election.
The LDP president is selected by
Diet members belonging to the
party and three representatives
from each prefecture. Each prefec-
ture decides how to choose their
representatives. There are a total
of 528 votes: 387 in the Diet and
141 from the prefectural represen-
tatives. The deadline for declaring
candidacy is tomorrow, and the vote
will take place on September 23. 
And at the moment, there are
three candidates. I do not think
there will be more. The three are
the secretary general of the LDP,
Taro Aso, grandson of former prime
minister Yoshida; Yasuo Fukuda,
son of former prime minister Takeo
Fukuda; and Fukushiro Nukaga, 
the current minister of finance.
Many newspapers are report-
ing that Aso is the front-runner, 
but he is not. There is a massive
shift to Fukuda. One key factor is
that Sadakazu Tanigaki, head of
another important LDP faction, 
has decided not to run and will
back Fukuda. 
Makoto Koga, who heads
another important faction, is also
backing Fukuda. Kato Koichi and
former LDP secretary general Taku
Yamazaki are among others who
will support Fukuda. 
There is a question of what
Nukaga will do. He comes from the
Tsushima faction, which used to be
the Tanaka faction and also was the
largest faction in the LDP. It has
been replaced by the Machimura
faction in that position, the one to
which Koizumi, Abe, and Fukuda
belong. If Nukaga stays in the race,
The single-member
district system is
pulling out the roots of
Japanese grassroots
democracy.
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he will draw votes away from Fukuda.
I think there is a strong likelihood
that he will withdraw and that the
Tsushima faction will back Fukuda.
But even if he runs, the probability
of Aso becoming prime minister is
extremely low. He is too closely
identified with Abe as secretary
general, and he is not popular
among the Diet members, though
he does have some considerable
support among the general public. 
Aso’s strategy is very clear. 
He will try to get most of those
141 prefectural votes by promising
to spread around a lot of money 
to regions that feel neglected. He
talks about putting fiscal discipline
on hold while the government deals
with this issue. He will try to appeal
to this chiiki kakusa, or regional
disparity, but to be elected presi-
dent of the LDP, he has to get the
support of the party’s Diet mem-
bers, and he does not have that.
Fukuda, on the other hand,
belongs to the same faction as
Abe, but he has made it clear ever
since Abe became prime minister
that he does not share many of
Abe’s views. 
Even though Fukuda does not
appear hungry for power, yesterday
he announced he would run. There
is now a big shift of support to him.
I believe this is because Fukuda 
will be balanced; he will continue 
to emphasize reform. He was the
chief cabinet secretary under
Koizumi for four of the five years,
and he could be seen as holding de
facto power in the Foreign Ministry
when Makiko Tanaka was foreign
minister. 
Even though his resume 
does not include previous cabinet
appointments, except as chief 
cabinet secretary, he held this post
for a long time. He was in charge of
foreign policy and was pushing
reform to strengthen the prime
minister’s office. He also ran the
Office for Gender Equality.
Fukuda can appeal to a wide
constituency, and this is the only
way the LDP can win the next 
election. The task he faces is
extremely difficult. There will not
be a tax hike because you cannot
pass any bill through the Diet that
the DPJ opposes, and it opposes
an increase in the consumption tax.
Fukuda will try to find ways to
increase government spending on
welfare and other programs in non-
metropolitan Japan, but he will not
throw fiscal discipline to the winds.
Fukuda will be much more cautious
and take a balanced approach
compared to Aso. In my view,
Fukuda is the right choice for
Japan at the current time. Electing
him does not mean a return to the
bad old days of factional politics.
The old system has been pretty
thoroughly destroyed and discred-
ited. Electing Fukuda will be a
manifestation of the LDP’s instinct
for survival. Fukuda will provide the
stability, sense of balance, and
middle-of-the-road foreign policy
that the public seems to want now.
There is also the issue of
extending antiterror legislation 
to allow Japanese Maritime Self-
Defense Forces to refuel coalition
vessels in the Indian Ocean 
supporting forces fighting in
Afghanistan. If not extended, the
legislation will end in the beginning
of November. When Abe resigned,
he mentioned as a reason the fact
that Ichiro Ozawa, head of the DPJ,
would not talk to him regarding the
legislation. 
One of the great advantages
for the LDP, and one of the huge
problems Abe’s resignation poses
to Ozawa is that if Abe had not
resigned, Ozawa was going to
make this antiterror legislation
issue the key issue to force the
LDP to dissolve the house and call
an election.
The LDP is likely to submit new
legislation after the current law
expires and the mission is suspended.
Ozawa has to worry that he will be
portrayed as irresponsible if he
simply opposes a continuation of
this modest Japanese role in the
war against terrorism. 
The American government
would be well advised to keep quiet
regarding this legislation. Any 
mention of its disappointment with
Japan for not pursuing the legisla-
tion could harm Fukuda and pave
the way for Ozawa to attain power.
All the pressure in the world is not
going to move Ozawa, and it can
only make Fukuda appear weak.
The legislation is going to expire
not because the prime minister
wants it to, but because in a demo-
cratic election, Japanese voters
gave the party that opposes it a
victory. It is not seemly for the
Bush administration to appear to
argue against the workings of a
democratic political process. 
Also, will Fukuda be able to
continue the pace of economic
reform begun under Koizumi? Now
that Koizumi and his charisma are
gone, Fukuda may not be able to
convince the public to accept the
bitter bill of reform. The public did
not support Koizumi because it
liked economic reform. It supported
economic reform because it liked
and trusted Koizumi. The process
will likely slow down but not neces-
sarily reverse itself. A great degree
of leadership and political skill is
needed to convince the voters to
accept continued reform. 
Fukuda is the 
right choice for Japan
at the current time.
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Fukuda is not seen as charis-
matic, but he is well versed on
relevant political issues and knows,
simply put, how to run a government.
Before we move on, I will briefly
discuss Ozawa. The DPJ is mostly
a party of urban people, both the
politicians and the constituency.
DPJ politicians tend to know little
about rural Japan. 
But Ozawa comes from Iwate
Prefecture, a farming district, and
he decided more than a year ago
that the LDP Achilles heel was in
rural Japan, and he formulated a
program to get those votes. He
went around by helicopter to cam-
paign in rural villages in Kyushu,
southern Honshu, and Shikoku.
Ozawa told LDP supporters 
in these rural areas that Japan has
to change agricultural policy to an
incomes support policy, guarantee-
ing rice prices when they begin to
fall. This pulls the rug out from any
incentive to reform Japanese agri-
culture, that is, to make it more
efficient, but it obviously makes
farmers happy.
The LDP actually has a good
agricultural reform program in
terms of creating larger leaseholds
so that corporations can manage
whole villages. It is a very compli-
cated issue, but Ozawa treated it in
a very politically smart, savvy way.
He told small farmers they could
keep their land and the government
would support them. The LDP will
have to counter this appeal. 
Ozawa has shown time after time
that he is a good tactician but a bad
strategist. He has already made two
mistakes since the July 29 election.
First, he had the DPJ submit a bill to
the Upper House to freeze privati-
zation of the postal system.
He did this for a purely a tacti-
cal reason; the bill has little chance
of passing. Ozawa wanted a small
party named Kokumin Shinto,
which consists of former LDP Diet
members, to join with him to form 
a larger voting block in the DPJ.
This is in spite of the fact that the
voters overwhelmingly supported
Koizumi’s agenda on postal reform
in the September 2005 elections.
He did not see the big picture.
While criticizing Abe for not heed-
ing the will of the people and
resigning after the Upper House
defeat, he blithely rejects the over-
whelming demonstration of the will
of the people in the 2005 Lower
House election to back Koizumi on
postal system reform. 
His second mistake involves
the antiterror legislation, which
allows Japanese Maritime Self-
Defense Forces to refuel coalition
vessels in the Indian Ocean.
Writing a new bill that provides
greater transparency into these
operations may be well received by
the Japanese public, but Ozawa is
short sighted in his stated reason
for opposition. He says that the
war in Afghanistan is America’s
war. It has nothing to do with
Japan, because the United States
did not get prior authorization from
the U.N. Security Council to go
attack the Taliban. Japan-U.S. 
relations would be in a state of
utter crisis if Koizumi had taken
this stance after 9/11.
The point here is this: do not
underestimate the ability of Ozawa
to overplay his hand and drive
many voters back to the LDP, 
especially if it is able to win back
some of the rural votes.
Ozawa was shocked by the
suddenness of Abe’s resignation.
He thought he could continue to
whittle away at LDP popularity 
and in December there would be 
a Lower House election, hopefully
with Abe still there, and they would
come to power.
The DPJ needs a strategy for
winning the next Lower House
election; it does not currently have
one. That is not to say that the LDP
does. Abe left a mess behind him,
and it will be interesting to see who




Where is the security alliancewith the United States and
the American bases in Japan in the
middle of all this political to-ing and
fro-ing? Is there any consideration
that they might want to revisit that
or ask us to exit the bases, or is it
something people have not thought
about?
GERALD CURTIS
No, that issue is not on thetable at all. There is no serious
anti-Americanism even within the
DPJ, much less the LDP. There is
no movement to kick the Americans
out. U.S.-Japan security relations
are getting tighter all the time. The
antiterror legislation issue and pos-
sible overreaction from Washington
may create a backlash in Japan,
but American bases in Japan are
not going away.
QUESTION
Iheard you speak a year ago whenAbe was first coming in, and the
big issue, as I recall, was whether
or not he would go to the Yasukuni
Shrine. You have not said anything
about that. When I was recently in
China, it seemed to me that China
was pleased with the present 
status of this issue, and yet some
The DPJ needs a 
strategy for winning 
the next Lower House
election; it does not 
currently have one.
That is not to say that
the LDP does.
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people have said subsequently 
that there may be dissatisfaction 
in Japan with the way Abe had
treated the China issue. 
GERALD CURTIS
Koizumi told me he was themost pro-Chinese politician in
Japan, but no one could tell him how
to pay respects to the war dead.
He said visiting the Yasukuni Shrine
was the correct way to do this. 
But Abe was much more right
wing and has questions about how
much guilt Japan actually bears 
for the war, but in the real world of
politics, both the Chinese and the
Japanese concluded they had to
take advantage of the opportunity
of Koizumi leaving office to find a
breakthrough. 
I was in Beijing when Abe’s
book Towards a Beautiful Country:
My Vision for Japan was published.
I spoke with Japan specialists in
the Chinese government who were
translating the book for the senior
Chinese leadership. Their conclu-
sion was that Abe would not go to
Yasukuni, and that the Chinese
leadership should go forward on
that assumption. They were right.
He did not go.
So Abe was invited to China
and went within a month of becom-
ing prime minister. That is when 
his popularity numbers were at
their peak. It has been straight
downhill ever since, but neither
country has anything to gain from 
a deterioration of the relationship.
The Chinese do not want any prob-
lems before the Olympics. Also,
Japan is a very important export
market for China. 
With Fukuda, Japan’s relation-
ship with China will improve.
Fukuda is opposed to visiting the
Yasukuni Shrine. He has said so
publicly. His father was the key
person in developing relations with
other Asian nations, including
China, so not only is Fukuda very
Asia minded, but he also has good
relations with the United States.
Abe did not have this level of
sophistication in foreign relations.
He managed to maintain a decent
relationship with China, but he
pushed what can be called an anti-
China coalition of the United
States, Japan, Australia, and India.
Fukuda, on the other hand, will
maintain an even-keeled relation-
ship with China.
QUESTION
In a related vein, what was thesignificance when Prime Minister
Abe went to India to pay respect to
both the Indian judge at the Tokyo
War Crimes Trial and the rebel
leader allied with the Japanese in
World War II?
GERALD CURTIS
Abe is preoccupied by the past,and I think it has a great deal to
do with his grandfather. Abe’s mission
in life, I believe, was to accomplish
what his grandfather, Prime Minister
Kishi, did not accomplish.
Prime Minister Kishi was the
first Japanese prime minister to
With Fukuda, 
Japan’s relationship
with China will improve.
Fukuda is opposed 
to visiting the 
Yasukuni Shrine.
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visit with Justice Pal, the sole 
dissenting judge in the Tokyo War
Crimes Trial in India. Prime Minister
Abe then visited Pal’s  81-year-old
son. The rebel leader you refer to,
Chandra Bose, was supported by
the Nazis and the Japanese mili-
tary and has a shrine dedicated to
him in Shinjuku, Tokyo. He is the
darling of the Japanese extreme
right because he reinforces the
message that the Second World
War was about freeing Asian coun-
tries from Western imperialism. 
Why did Abe go to India and
visit with the son of Justice Pal? He
was either playing to the right wing
back in Japan or trying to honor his
grandfather’s legacy. The right wing
view is that Japan lost its identity
after World War II. Abe is not a
sophisticated ideologue. These are
not deeply held, deeply thought-
through ideas. These are simply
deeply held feelings that got trans-
ferred down through his family. His
visit to India made China and Korea
question Japanese views about the
war and made even Washington
question Abe’s intentions. 
I think this is a personal issue
for Abe, but the office of prime
minister isn’t a place to give vent 
to your own emotions. It is a job to
accomplish policy that serves the
country’s interest. He never did
that. He never focused on the policy
issues. He entrusted his cabinet 
to take care of policy. The result
has been a government in neutral
gear on most policy issues for the
past year.
QUESTION
What do you think of theeffects of the subprime loan
crisis on Japan? Also, it appears
that Japan is increasingly relying
on aircraft and weapon contracts
for new business, to stimulate the
economy. Is that of significance?
GERALD CURTIS
Iwill defer to Professor Patrick onyour first question.
Regarding your second ques-
tion, the Japanese defense budget
has been reduced slightly each
year for the last five years. Actual
spending has been reconfigured.
There is a lot of spending on
antiballistic missile defense and
some other high tech expensive
items.
But there is a perception in
other countries that the Japanese
are on a march to expand their
military. You cannot, however, find
evidence for this in the military
budget. You see some evidence 
for it in changing definitions of 
missions, and the United States
has been pushing Japan to play 
a bigger role. Former deputy secre-
tary of state Richard Armitage, for
example, pushed Japan to play a
more important role in the military
war on terror.
And the Japanese responded,
by taking such measures as moving
the status of the defense agency to
a defense ministry.
The point is when you are
asked to do more, you want to have
a bigger say about what should be
done. That is becoming a problem
in U.S.-Japan relations.
In the past, the Japanese
refused to buy what we call “off-
the-shelf” military equipment from
the United States. They wanted to
buy the components and assemble
them independently in order to
develop technological skills. So the
Japanese have always had a hedge
on the import of weapons from the
United States. They have a license
to manufacture the hardware.
But now the situation is 
changing. The Japanese want to
purchase completely assembled
advanced F-22 fighter jets.
Congress does not allow export of
these items. The Japanese are
upset that the United States will
not sell this weapons system to its
strongest ally in the region.
Now the Japanese are begin-
ning to play hardball by looking to
France and other countries for
possible alternatives in terms of
fighter jets and other military
equipment. The United States
needs to look at Japan in a differ-
ent way to anticipate future issues,
whether they be on defense or any-
thing else.
HUGH PATRICK
Iwill just say something about thesubprime loan issue.
On the subprime loan issue, 
I think it shows, first of all, that
Japan is not directly exposed in
terms of Japanese holdings of
assets that look like they may
default or lose a lot of value directly.
But what this really shows is how
integrated financial markets have
become, not only globally, but also
across asset classes. Up until now,
we have all understood that credit
risk was not priced adequately. The
spreads were narrowing too much,
but nobody knew exactly how that
was going to end until now.
“Across asset classes” means
that essentially everybody has
been moving from more risky to
less risky assets, a flight to safety.
And one of the byproducts of that
was that people who borrowed—or
institutions that borrowed yen at a
low interest rate in order to rein-
vest in higher interest rate assets
around the world—have decided
they do not want to take that risk.
Abe is not a 
sophisticated 
ideologue . . . These are
simply deeply held 
feelings that got 
transferred down
through his family.
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As a result, the yen has appreci-
ated sharply and unexpectedly,
and that has potentially affected
the export industry and certainly
affected the stock market.
The next question is what will
happen in the future. I believe the
carry trade, borrowing yen and
then lending the assets abroad,
investing abroad in higher yielding
investments, will return. It may not
return to the same degree, but it
certainly is an area of uncertainty.
QUESTION
My question has two parts—one is how much support
does revision of the Constitution
have within the rest of the LDP,
and, secondly, are those reforms
pretty much dead in the water now
or is there a possibility they may
continue? Thank you.
GERALD CURTIS
Somewhere down the road,there may be some revision of
the Japanese Constitution. It will
not happen in at least in the next
five years. There is a lot of agree-
ment that the Constitution can be
revised if there is a reason to revise
it. But there is no consensus on
what to revise. 
One issue that is dead in the
water right now is a revision of
Article 9, the abandonment of the
war clause. If Abe had won on July
29, his study group would have
concluded next month that Japan
has the right to engage in collec-
tive self-defense. That means
sending troops to aid another
country, like the United States, in a
third country contingency. 
Under the current interpreta-
tion of the Japanese Constitution,
Japan does not have the right to
engage in collective self-defense.
In other words, the United States
can help Japan defend itself, but
Japan cannot help the United
States defend another country or
itself. The study group will not even
be reconstituted under the next
prime minister. 
Constitutional reform is not 
a burning issue. The public is not
opposed to it, but nobody thinks it
will solve any pressing problems. 
I do not think we will see Fukuda
push constitutional revision at all.
Constitutional reform 
is not a burning issue.
The public is not
opposed to it, 
but nobody thinks 
it will solve any 
pressing problems.
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